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REGULATION OF BusINESs-SHERMAN ACT-CONCERTED REFUSALS To 
DEAL NoT ILLEGAL PER SE-The government sought an injunction re-
straining the members of an organization of independent insurance 
agents responsible for writing nearly 80 percent of the fire insurance in 
the Cleveland, Ohio, area from carrying out association regulations. 
Adherence to the rules was challenged as a conspiracy in restraint 
of trade and an attempt to monopolize in violation of sections I and 2 
of the Sherman Act.1 The regulations were designed to prevent the mem-
bers from representing (1) mutual insurance companies, (2) branch office 
companies which contribute to the agents a portion of their overhead 
expense and, (3) insurance companies which operate branch offices 
and solicit or sell direct to the insured. The restrictions were enforced 
by threat of membership"forfeiture. These rules, the government pleaded, 
amounted to concerted refusals to deal, i.e., boycotts, and as such were 
alleged to be illegal per se. The defendant contended that "the restraints 
imposed are reasonable in the light of the circumstances in which they oper-
ate." On motion by both parties for summary judgment, held, the rule 
of reason must be applied to determine the legality of concerted refusals 
to deal.2 United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (N.D. Ohio 1956) 
144 F. Supp. 684. 
The frequent condemnation by the courts of concerted refusals to 
deal has given rise to the suggestion that such practices are per se illegal.a 
Some Supreme Court dicta4 appear on their face to affirm such a doctrine. 
126 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1-2. 
2 Using this standard the court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment in declaring the "direct writer rule" (3), illegal; but overruled the motions by both 
parties on the "expense contribution rule" (2) and the "mutual rule" (1) and retained 
jurisdiction for a determination on the merits. 
s See Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act," 
IO GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 309-313 (1942); 58 YALE L.J. 1121 at 1137 (1949). Compare 
LAMB AND K.n-rnu.E, TRADE AssOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE §10.6 (1956). 
4 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 522 (1948); Times-Picayune 
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 625 (1953). In United States v. New 
Orleans Insurance Exchange, (E.D. La. 1957), 1957 CCH Trade Cas. 1]68,616, a case pre-
senting facts very similar to those in the principal case, the court admitted that a con-
tended status of per se illegality for boycotts has "much support from the authorities" 
[apparently relying upon Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) and 
the dicta in United States v. Columbia Steel, supra and International Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)]. The court, unaided by this reasoning, proceeded to find the 
challenged practices illegal as violations of the rule of reason. But cf. the attitude ex-
pressed by the court in Union Circulating Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1957), 1957 CCH 
Trade Cas. 1]68,637, where a distinction is drawn between boycotts illegal on their face and 
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These dicta seem open to question, however, since the schemes struck 
down in the cases supporting those statements contained either unlawful 
objects5 or the employment of illegal means.s Notwithstanding that group 
refusals to deal restrain trade, courts in the past have held or indicated 
that justifications may protect them from illegality where aimed at com-
batting unlawful relationships,7 dealing with credit transactions,s prevent-
ing abuse by unscrupulous dealers,9 or improvement of trade conditions 
within an industry.10 Inherent in the concerted refusal problem is· the 
necessity for a recognition of the important differences of purpose between 
refusals designed to coerce or exclude third parties and those used as a 
method of mutual control over the parties to the agreement with only an 
indirect restraint on third parties.11 The restraints in the former class 
represent the type which courts most quickly condemn.12 If the above 
distinction is valid, it is submitted that the difficulty of identifying an 
illegal refusal is aggravated by the common reference to all concerted 
refusals to deal as "boycotts" since the unlawful connotations accompany-
ing the term actually suggest the answer to the question to be decided.18 
Against such an antitrust background the district court's refusal to follow 
the Supreme Court dicta14 does not appear inconsistent with past appli-
those which require closer scrutiny before a determination can be made (citing the 
principal case). 
5 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) 
(object was elimination of competition); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra 
(object was destruction of "style piracy" competition); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and 
Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (object was price fixing); Montague v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904) 
(object was restraining non-members free access to market). 
6 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (use of dominant position to 
limit outsiders' opportunities). The cooperative practices (spying, "black lists," etc.) in 
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, note 5 supra, and Fashion 
Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra, were illicit means to accomplish an unlawful 
object. 
7 United States v. American Livestock Commission Co., 279 U.S. 435 at 438 (1929). 
s See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). See also United States v. 
Cincinnati Fruit and Produce Credit Assn., (S.D. Ohio 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,248 
(permitted only cash sales to delinquents). Cf. United States v. First National Pictures, 
282 U.S. 44 (1930); 29 MICH. L. REv. 909 at 914 (1931). 
9 See Butterick Publishing Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 522 at 527. 
10 See Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Sugar Institute v. United States, 
297 U.S. 553 at 597-599 (1936). Cf. Dior v. Milton, (N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. 
'1[68,418. But see Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra. And see Barber, "Re-
fusals To Deal Under the Anti-Trust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 847 at 874-876 (1955); 
and Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act," 10 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 305 (1942). 
11 See Barber, "Refusals To Deal Under the Anti-Trust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 
847 at 872-879 (1955); Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the 
Sherman Act," IO GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 305 (1942). 
12 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, note 5 supra; Fashion 
Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra; Millinery Creators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469 
(1941). 
18 Cf. the reluctance by the members of the Attorney General's Committee to use the 
term "patent pool." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMnTEE TO STUDY 
THE ANTITRUST LAws 242 (1955), hereinafter cited as REPORT. 
14 In principal case, at 698, the court respectfully states, "If the dicta are to be re-
garded as a prophecy of the court's adoption of the doctrine of per se illegality in future 
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cations,15 and the rejection of a per se solution for concerted refusals 
seems to echo the recent Supreme Court affirmation that it "has not re-
ceded from the Rule [of Reason]" as the keynote to antitrust enforce-
ment.16 The "direct writer" rule in the instant case was branded un-
lawful because the members had restricted their freedom to contract with 
the purpose and effect of restraining some insurance companies from 
competing within the Cleveland vicinity.17 Neither benefits received 
by the public nor protection of the insurance agent's expiration lists 
from piracy by the insurers were deemed to justify this group action. 
Lack of evidence and disputed questions of fact prevented further ad-
judication of the other rules, but the court's suggestion that the regu-
lations would be permitted if they served lawful intra-group functions 
though giving rise to slight restraints on outsiders is noteworthy.is The 
presence of state insurance regulation which can serve as a restraining 
force on self-help measures within this particular segment of commerce 
relax.es the necessity of tight federal control, and is another persuasive 
factor for applying the rule of reason to the instant case.19 Admitting 
that every concerted refusal to deal restrains some trade, this court's ap-
proach is commendable in that it recognizes the need for some degree 
of protection of self-regulatory trade association activities that realize 
substantial benefits to its members and the public,20 and only indirectly 
affect outsiders. In such instances a rigid per se illegality rule would 
automatically condemn certain trade association activities compatible 
with the public interest. Preservation of the rule of reason approach for 
concerted refusal to deal problems would seem to be the more appealing 
alternative, for it reserves sufficient latitude for the curtailment of un-
boycott cases, it seems reasonable to predict that its application will be limited to cases 
where a combination seeks by coercion, intimidation, or threats to compel outsiders to 
do or refrain from doing that which the group approves or condemns •••• " 
15 That Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra, and Associated Press v. 
United States, note 6 supra, prominent cases with per se reputations, do not preclude 
justifiable concerted refusals, see 58 YALE L.J. 1138 (1949). The REPORT 132-137 sanctions 
a speedy finding of illegality where a concerted refusal to coerce outside parties is found 
without recommending an absolute per se approach. See also Barber, "Refusals To Deal 
Under Anti-Trust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 847 at 879 (1955). 
16 United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377 at 387 (1956). See 
principal case at 698. 
17 However, the court recognized in the instant case, at 700, that individual refusals 
would be lawful. 
18 Principal case at 706. 
19 Cf. the Fashion Originators' Guild case, note 4 supra, and the Millinery case, note 
12 supra, where no similar instrument of control over industry self-help measures was 
present. 
20 For excellent treatment of antitrust hazards connected with trade association activi-
ties, see generally LAMB AND Kn-n:u.E, 'TRADE AssoCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE (1956). For 
a discussion of trade association usefulDess see Oppenheim, "Federal Anti-Trust Legis-
lation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 
1171 (1952); Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act," 
10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 305, 396-405 (1942); REPORT 17. See also 32 CoL. L. REv. 
313 (1932); 39 YALE L.J. 884 (1930); 26 VA. L. REv. 828 (1940), for further discussion of 
activities connected with enforcement devices. 
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desirable restraints measured by the facts of the particular challenged 
situation and prevents a "mechanistic"21 approach that could be used to 
preclude beneficial business restraints.22 
Gerald D. Rapp 
21 That antitrust enforcement expediency should take a back seat to the basic policy 
of promoting competition see Oppenheim, "A New Look at Antitrust Enforcement 
Trends," D1sr. CoL. B.A.J. lll at 120 (1950). See generally Oppenheim, "Federal Anti-
trust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy,'' 50 MICH. L. REv. 
ll39 (1950) advocating a restricted use of the per se approach. 
22 See 58 YALE L.J. ll21 at ll40 (1949), suggesting that maintenance of this delicate 
balance between lawful and unlawful concerted refusals is a desirable alternative to 
illegality per se. 
